Coordination of or at least absence of confl ict between monetary and fi scal policies are key to the successful implementation of economic policy. The article aims to use reaction functions to assess whether the monetary and fi scal policies in the countries of the Visegrad Group are in coordination or in confl ict and which variables infl uence their decisions. The central bank is the representative of monetary policy, which has interest rates as its instrument, and the government as the representative of the fi scal policy which has change revenue or spending as a share of GDP as instrument. To obtain the results, multivariate regression analysis is used. The research period is based on quarterly observations from fi rst quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2012. Stabilizing role of monetary policy and in some countries also partially stabilizing role of fi scal policy has been found. Another result was that in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, monetary policy appears to play the dominant role, whereas fi scal policy plays dominant role in Hungary. In the case of Slovakia, some diff erent results may be due to Slovakia's participation in ERM II, which led to the monetary policy, in addition to maintaining price stability, also aiming to maintain a fi xed exchange rate and the subsequent entry of Slovakia into the Eurozone and the de facto loss of autonomous monetary policy.
INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy is, together with fi scal policy, among the most important economic policies. The bearer of fi scal policy is usually the government and the bearer of monetary policy is the central bank. From the perspective of a successful economic policy, the coordination of, or at least lack of confl ict between, these two bearers (i.e. governments and central banks) is crucial. The objectives of these policies, however, are usually diff erent. For monetary policy, it is primarily maintaining price stability, while fi scal policy is primarily aimed at supporting economic growth and achieving low unemployment rate, or high employment rate. Given these diff erent objectives, confl icts may occur (but not necessarily, both policies may cooperate with each other). These policies are also independent in their decision making (the central bank has its independence defi ned by law). In their decisions, monetary and fi scal policies must take into account other macroeconomic indicators and also the behaviour of the other of the two policies.
This article aims to assess the behaviour of monetary and fi scal policy in the countries of the Visegrad group to determine which variables infl uence the decision of the authorities, economic policy and whether the policies take into account each other in their decisions (if so, whether the two policies are in mutual harmony or confl ict). This paper evaluates the mutual interaction of monetary and fi scal policy from the game theoretical approach. The game theoretical approach is not prevailing method of evaluation of the monetary and fi scal interactions. Furthermore, compared to similar papers, this article does not use the set of panel data for many countries. Thus, this article does not attempt to derive the universal function of behavior of the economic policy authorities across countries (Melitz, 2000 or Wyplosz, 1999 ) examine this issue). We assume that the behavior of economic policy authorities and their mutual interaction may diff er in the diff erent countries (depending on the institutional arrangements). However, we do not focus to only one country (Řežábek, 2011) examines this issue), but we deal with four relatively diff erent countries (PL -the large closed economy, CZ -the small opened economy, SK -the euro area country, HU -the country with economic and political problems). These countries are also characterized by a similar recent history (the economic transformation) and the geographical proximity. In this set will be examined similarities and diff erences of the economic policy environment.
To achieve these objectives, multivariate regression analysis is used through which the dependence of the main instruments of both policies (for monetary policy it is the change of interest rates of the central bank, for fi scal policy it is the change in expenditure or revenue as a share of GDP) on selected independent variables is examined. The surveyed countries are countries of the Visegrad Group, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, using quarterly data from the fi rst quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2012.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE INTERACTION OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY
The fi rst papers that examined the interaction of fi scal and monetary policy began to be created mainly a er the Second World War, for example Friedman (1948) and Tinbergen (1954) . The development of mutual interaction and eff ects occurs in 1980s in the famous article by Sargent and Wallace (1981) . They argue that the central bank as the bearer of monetary policy may, under certain circumstances, lose control of price developments. This responded to the monetarists, for example to Friedman (1968) , who argued that the central bank cannot permanently aff ect the real output or unemployment, but can control the price level (especially in the long term). Sargent and Wallace (1981) show, however, that even when meeting the monetarist assumptions, the central bank may lose control over price developments. If it becomes a submissive player with respect to the government 1 and the fi rst step shall be made by the government, which chooses a strategy of defi cit budgets, the central bank must adapt by increasing revenue through seigniorage in order to comply with intertemporal budget constraint. In the so-called weak version of the fi scal theory of the price level, the government -fi scal authority may prevent the central bank -the monetary authority from achieving price stability and controlling price developments.
Some papers deal with the interaction of monetary and fi scal policy in theoretical view, especially in game-theoretical approach, e. g. Hughes Hallet, Libich and Stehlík (2014) ; Libich, Savage and Walsh (2011); Leeper (2010) ; Demertzis, Hughes Hallet and Viegi (2004) ; Dixit and Lambertini (2003) or van Aarle, Engwerda and Plamans (2002) . Hughes Hallet, Libich and Stehlík (2014) examine strategic fi scal-monetary interactions in a novel game-theory framework with asynchronous timing of moves that generalize the standard commitment concept of Stackelberg leadership by making it dynamic. They show that the eff ect of monetary commitment on economic outcomes and interaction crucially depends on its explicitness relationship (i.e. high credibility and goals of central bank and whether it is legislated as a numerical target).
The interaction of monetary and fi scal policy is investigated empirically by another group of authors; those articles include, among others, Řežábek (2011); Gali, Peroti (2003) ; Melitz (2000) ; or Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) . Another area of research is related to the interaction of fi scal and monetary policy within a monetary union; papers in the topic include Libich, Stehlík and Savage (2010) , Balboni, Buti and Larch (2007) , Onorante (2006) , Buti, Roeger and Velt (2001) or Wyplosz (1999) . Buti, Roeger and Velt (2001) claim in their theoretical model that a potential confl ict between fi scal and monetary policy arises thanks to the fact that objective function of a central bank (a monetary policy authority) is diff erent from an objective function of a government (a fi scal policy authority). The government tries to achieve the stabilization or maximization of the output, whereas a central bank is focused on maintaining price stability. As well as Demertzis, Hughes Hallet and Viegi (2004) mentioned that, thanks to the diff erent goals of both policies and their mutual independence, a confl ict my arise. The confl ict can by analysed by using the methodical framework the game theory.
The mutual position of the both policies is an important question, too. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) consider Stackelberg's type of interaction when the decision is not simultaneous (the Nash's balance is not reached 2 ) but sequential (the Stackleberg's balance). In that case, a central bank is a dominant player, makes the fi rst step (it is called the Stackleberg's leader in the game theory) and fi scal policy follows it. A leader foresees the follower's reaction and this infl uences its policy. The follower has to adapt a leader's policy. Balboni, Buti and Larch (2007) defi ne it similarly. An opposite opinion is claimed by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) ; they argue that by diff erent timing and decision making of both policies, fi scal policy can become the Stackelberg's leader. The reason is that while a central bank can change interest rates very quickly, a government usually approves state budget annually.
In his study, Řežábek (2011) deals with the interaction of monetary and fi scal policy in the context of game theory. He relies on the assumption of non-cooperative game, Nash equilibrium and sequential decision-making through Stackelberg equilibrium. The country surveyed is the Czech Republic. The interaction of the two policies is investigated by simultaneous decisions. An important element in his work consists in diff erent estimates of potential output or output gap of fi scal and monetary policy. Monetary policy instrument is represented by the change in interest rates; fi scal policy instrument in the basic model is represented by the change of balance of the state budget as a share of GDP. In other models, it is a change of total government revenue as a share of GDP and the change of total government spending as a share of GDP. The paper concludes the following: fi scal policy responds to the change in monetary policy in the same direction, the response of monetary policy to fi scal policy is ambiguous (basic model suggests opposite reaction of monetary policy to fi scal policy, other models fail to confi rm a signifi cant response). Other conclusions are counter-cyclical behaviour of the two policies, the stabilization reaction of monetary policy on infl ation and on expected infl ation, and also destabilizing eff ect of government debt on the state budget. Řežábek (2011) fi nally concludes that monetary policy is the leader and fi scal policy is the follower in the Czech Republic.
In his article, Melitz (2000) examined the interaction of fi scal and monetary policies in 19 OECD countries (including 14 EU countries) on annual data from 1959 or 1976 to 1995. Estimates are performed simultaneously. Dependent variables for monetary policy are money market rate, and for fi scal policy the primary budget balance to GDP. Furthermore, he also works with variable government spending and tax revenues. This allows him to better examine the procyclicality of fi scal policy on the development of the economy. His results show that fi scal policy has a stabilizing eff ect -its reaction to increasing debt is increasing tax revenues and reducing government spending as a share of GDP. He also found that tax revenue has a stabilizing eff ect, while government spending has a destabilizing eff ect. The fi nal conclusion is that fi scal and monetary policy interacts in the opposite direction -i.e. in a confl ict. Loose fi scal policy means more restrictive monetary policy. Wyplosz (1999) , in contrast to Melitz (2000) , focused only on EU countries. He also works with annual data from 1980 to 1997. As a dependent variable he chose primary budget surplus for fi scal policy, and short-term interest rate for monetary policy. The choice of independent variables is similar. Wyplosz (1999) , however, unlike Melitz (2000) , does not estimate equations simultaneously but individually. His results imply that monetary policy also reacts, in addition to infl ation, to output in a counter-cyclical manner. He claims, however, that estimate of output plays a big role in the decision-making and in the calculation of the infl ation prediction. Also, fi scal policy responds to the output in a counter-cyclical manner, and to some extent on infl ation. Another of his conclusion is that fi scal and monetary policies are to some extent substitutable for one another. Furthermore, rather in theory, he argues that the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union represents a fi scal commitment which governments should follow to some extent.
The fi scal and monetary policy interactions may be also studied using DSGE or New Keynesian models. For example Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2004) examine the extent to which fi scal policy (automatic stabilisers) assist or hinder monetary policy when the latter takes a standard forwardlooking infl ation targeting form. Leith and Thadden (2006) researched that without explicit reference to level of government debt is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fi scal policy instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics.
2 The Nash's balance is based on the assumption that players minimalize their loss functions in the same time without respect to the eff ects of policy arrangements of an opponent. Behavior of every player is determined from the beginning. It does not depend on the opponent's behavior. In the case of Nash's equilibrium, none of the players can improve its situation by one-sided change of chosen strategy. One of these alternatives of this type of reaching the equilibrium, which is o en mentioned in literature, is the interaction of the Stackelberg's type where the leader is one of the players. The leader's goal is to foresee the reaction of the opponent, the follower, and this reaction to integrate into his own decision making.
FORMULATION OF MODELS AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Specifi cation of Models
In the empirical part, consideration is given to reaction functions of fi scal and monetary authorities. Furthermore, it is examined which variables infl uence them and whether one aff ects the each other. Formulation of reaction functions is mainly based on Wyplosz (1999) , Melitz (2000) and Řežábek (2011) . Dependent variables are changes in the principal policy instrument. The reaction functions of fi scal and monetary policies are given in the following equations:
The reaction function of fi scal policy has the following specifi cation:
  is the change of state budget expenditures as a share of GDP between period t and period t − 1, Δd t−1 is the change of government debt in absolute value lagged by one period, y t denotes the GDP output gap at time t,
is the lagged value of government spending as a share of GDP, u t is unemployment rate at time t, and Δi t is the change in the interest rate at time t. Equation (2) The total budget expenditures as a share of GDP are used in our paper. In the term of mutual interaction can be assumed that the monetary policy reacts to the total budget expenditures of the fi scal policy and not only to the non-mandatory expenditures. Moreover, the fi scal policy considers the total budget expenditures as its main instrument and therefore the change of total expenditures shows the fi scal policy responses to the change of economic environment preferably. The fi scal authority considers the mandatory and nonmandatory parts of its expenditures and if, for example, the economy is in the recession, the fi scal policy cannot act intentionally and the cyclical part of expenditures (non-mandatory, automatic stabilizers) will increase. The fi scal expansion may not be detected in the non-mandatory expenditures necessarily.
The reaction function of monetary policy has the following specifi cation:
Δi t is the change in the interest rate of the central bank between period t and period t − 1, Δi t GB represents the change in interest rate of ten-year government bond between period t and period t − 1, y t denotes the output gap at time t, There are two reaction functions of fi scal policy. In both equations, it is assumed that the main instrument of fi scal policy is the state budget. In the fi rst function, the main instrument is the change of state budget expenditure as a share of GDP (the dependent variable). It is aff ected by the general government debt in absolute terms, or by its changes, as well as by an estimate of the output gap -whether the economy is above or below its potential output, the share of state budget expenditure to GDP in the previous period, the unemployment rate and the change in interest rates. Change in interest rates is representative of monetary policy. In the second fi scal policy equation, the dependent variable is the change in state revenue as a share of GDP. Independent variables are the same except for the lagged value of state budget revenue as a share of GDP. Dependent variables are expenditures and revenues of state budget. The state budget is the main instrument of fi scal policy and therefore this budget (or budget expenditures and revenues separately) should be used as dependent variable primarily.
Independent variables are chosen due to an economic theory and an economic policy practice. It can be expected, that fi scal policy decides about its expenditures and revenues having regard to the economic cycle. Hence, independent variables are the output gap and the unemployment. If fi scal policy performs stabilization policy, then the output gap and the unemployment are the objects of the stabilization primarily. Lagged value of government debt is chosen for monitoring fi scal responsibility and ability to react to the debt fi nancing of own policy.
In the reaction function of monetary policy, the main instrument is the change in the interest rates of the central bank. It is aff ected by changes in the ten-year government bond yield. This variable represents the long-term interest rate. Other independent variables include the output gap, similarly to the reaction functions of fi scal policy, changes in infl ation rate and the change in expenditure or revenue of the state budget as a share of GDP. These last two variables represent fi scal policy.
The reaction function of monetary policy is derived from the Taylor's rule, Taylor (1993) . Hence, dependent variable is the change of interest rate (main instrument of monetary policy) and independent variables are the change of infl ation rate and the output gap. Moreover, the government bond interest rate is added, because it can approximate expected infl ation and expected economic growth (see yield curve).
Estimated relations of all three equations are listed in Table I .
The table fi rst lists the coeffi cients for fi scal policy. For the lagged value of government debt Δd t−1 variable, a negative relation is expected in expenditure as a share of GDP and positive relation for revenues as a share of GDP. With increasing total debt, the government should respond by reducing spending (which implies a negative relation), or increasing revenue (the resulting positive relation) to prevent the total debt from further increasing or decreasing. For the output gap y t , the government is to implement counter-cyclical policies. In the case of a positive output gap it is to perform restriction and in the case of a negative output gap it is to perform expansion. Therefore negative relation is expected for expenditure and positive relation is expected for revenues. For lagged revenue or expenditure of the state budget as a share of GDP
negative relation is expected, which means that the fi scal instrument does not have eff ect completely, but only partially and further adaptation occurs in the following period. For the unemployment rate u t , positive relation is expected in the case of expenditures and negative relation is expected in the case of revenues. Given the rising unemployment rate, expansionary fi scal policy should be implemented (spending increases and/or revenue reduction). For the last variable that represents monetary policy Δi t we may encounter two situations -confl ict or coordination. For expenditures, coordination occurs with negative relation, the two policies have eff ect in the same direction, they perform either expansion, or restriction. In contrast, in case of positive relation, they are in confl ict. One of the policies carries out expansion, while the other performs restriction (such as government spending increases, performs expansion, but the central bank increases interest rates -performs restriction). In the case of revenues, the expected relations are opposite. Positive relation means coordination (government conducts restrictionincreases government revenue, and the central bank also implements restriction-increases interest rate) and negative relation means confl ict.
Furthermore, the table shows estimated coeffi cients for monetary policy. For the change of ten-year government bond yield Δi t GB positive relation is expected. This is because increasing yield implies higher expected infl ation in the future, to which monetary policy should respond by raising interest rates. For the output gap y t positive relation is expected. With a positive output gap, restriction is implemented (raising interest rates), while with a negative output gap expansion is implemented (lowering of interest rates). Another variable is the change in infl ation rate Δπ t . For this variable, there is a positive relation. The central bank must respond to the rising rate of infl ation by raising interest rates, and to decreasing rate of infl ation by reducing interest rates. The last two variables represent fi scal policy. Positive relation for the state budget expenditure as a share of GDP 
Description of the Data and Methods Used
Data are obtained from the database of the European Central Bank (revenue and expenditure as a share of GDP), Eurostat (variable output gap estimated from the GDP growth rates using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter, interest rate, rate of unemployment, government debt and the rate of yield of the ten-year government 
I: Estimated coeffi cients of the independent variables
Fiscal policy
bonds) and from the OECD database (the rate of infl ation measured by the consumer price index). The data obtained were statistically analysed, extreme values replaced, tests of stationarity of time series conducted using the ADF test, as well as autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PACF) tests. Regression functions were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). A total of twelve regression functions were estimated.
RESULTS
The following table shows the results of the reaction functions for fi scal policy.
The results of fi scal policy reaction functions indicated that some of the results in the surveyed countries are the same. Fiscal policy does not respond (with the exception of the revenue model of Slovakia) to the change in government debt in absolute terms. Moreover, relations are in most cases are contrary to expectations. All countries have countercyclical expenditure policy of the fi scal authority. Expenditure responds to the output gap and the unemployment rate with a stabilizing eff ect (however, some results are not statistically signifi cant). In contrast, revenue of two countries (Slovakia and Hungary) has destabilizing eff ect. In the Czech Republic and Poland the revenue Monetary policy appears to have stabilizing eff ect in all of the countries surveyed. The central bank reacts to changes in infl ation and also on the output gap with stabilizing eff ect. Similar results are concluded by e.g. Wyplosz (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) . Monetary policy also responds to expected infl ation (except Slovakia) with stabilizing eff ect. Statistically insignifi cant response of monetary policy to changes in expected infl ation rate and also statistical signifi cance only at 10% signifi cance level in the case of changes in infl ation is likely due to the participation of Slovakia in the ERM II, when monetary policy, in addition to the objective of maintaining price stability, aimed to maintain a fi xed exchange rate and subsequently the entry of Slovakia into the Eurozone and the de facto loss of autonomous monetary policy.
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland show a statistically signifi cant response of fi scal policy to monetary policy. In the case of the Czech Republic, expenditures act in the same direction (positive relation) to a change in the monetary policy instrument (interest rate change). Fiscal and monetary policy are therefore consistent and statistically signifi cant response of fi scal policy to monetary policy (and the lack of response of monetary policy to fi scal policy) means that fi scal policy adjusts to monetary policy. Monetary policy in the Czech Republic is therefore in the dominant role 3 . Similar results are also in Slovakia (fi scal policy responds to monetary policy by changing its revenue) and Poland, where fi scal policy responds in the same direction by changing its expenditure, but by changing their revenues in the opposite direction. In Hungary, fi scal policy shows no signifi cant reaction to monetary policy.
In contrast, monetary policy responds in the same direction to the revenues in the case of fi scal policy. Fiscal policy in Hungary is dominant (at least on the revenue side) to monetary policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results obtained it can be concluded that monetary policy operates with stabilizing eff ect in all countries surveyed. Fiscal policy has also rather stabilizing eff ect on the expenditure side (but not always statistically signifi cant); on the revenue side, stabilization reaction has not been statistically proven. This can be justifi ed by the fact that fi scal policy is relatively more fl exible on the expenditure side than on the revenue side. The government usually reacts with a change rather on the expenditure side than on the revenue side.
Fiscal policy reacts with statistical signifi cance in three of the four countries to monetary policy; for the Czech Republic and Poland, it is on the expenditure side with response in the same direction (fi scal policy also responds with expansion to monetary expansion of monetary policy, fi scal policy also responds to monetary restriction with restriction), for Slovakia and again Poland, it is on the revenue side and the response is contrary (fi scal policy responds to expansionary monetary policy in a restrictive way and vice versa). The reverse response (monetary policy to fi scal policy) has not been statistically proven.
In Hungary, the situation is diff erent. Monetary policy reacts with statistical signifi cance and in the same direction to fi scal policy (revenue); on the other hand, fi scal policy does not respond to monetary policy with statistical signifi cance. Fiscal policy in Hungary seems to be a dominant player, and monetary policy adapts to it.
In this paper, it was analysed Visegrad group states. It was fi nd, who plays dominant role and which variables are substantial for fi scal and monetary policy decision. 3 Also Řežábek (2011) argues that monetary policy in the Czech Republic is in the dominant role.
SUMMARY
Monetary policy and fi scal policy are among the most important economic policies of any state. Their coordination, or at least lack of confl ict, is crucial to the economic development of any country. The aim of this paper is to assess whether the monetary and fi scal policies in the countries of the Visegrad Group are in mutual coordination or confl ict. Also, what macroeconomic variables aff ect the decisions of the two policies. To achieve this objective, multivariate regression analysis is used, which is used to examine statistical signifi cance of independent variables. As a fi scal policy instrument, change of revenue or expenditure as a share of GDP is chosen; monetary policy instrument is the change in central bank interest rates. The surveyed period is based on quarterly data from 1 quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2012. The results show the stabilizing role of monetary policy in all countries (with some problems in Slovakia). Also, stabilizing role has been shown in expenditures as a share of GDP (but not always statistically signifi cant). On the revenue side as a share of GDP, stabilizing role has not been statistically proven. Other fi ndings include statistically signifi cant response of fi scal policy to monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. The reverse response (monetary policy to fi scal policy) has not been statistically proven. This implies the dominant role of monetary policy in these three countries. In the case of Hungary, statistically signifi cant response of monetary policy to fi scal policy has been found. Fiscal policy does not show statistically signifi cant response to monetary policy. This implies the dominant role of fi scal policy in Hungary.
